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Computers, Cables, and Citizenship: 
On the Desirability of Instant 
Direct Democracy* 
Richard Dagger 
Mulford Sibley is not the sort of scholar who makes a career of 
elaborating variations on a theme. There are recurring themes in his 
work, however, and I want to sound two of them, participatory 
democracy and technology, in this essay.1 These themes may be 
joined in a number of ways, but here I shall take up only one-the 
possibility that advances in communications technology may 
actually promote democracy by extending and enhancing 
opportunities for political participation. 
This possibility has been raised by several writers who have 
noticed that computers and coaxial cables now enable us to 
establish an instant direct democracy. 2 With the aid of computers 
and cables, it seems, we could install electronic voting devices in the 
homes of all citizens, disband our legislative bodies, and proceed to 
set policy by the direct vote of the electorate. What had hitherto 
seemed suitable only for the Greek polis, the Swiss canton, and the 
New England town now seems conceivable, at least, in the modern 
nation-state. 
To say that something is conceivable is not to say it is desirable, 
of course, and the latter point is my concern here. Is instant direct 
democracy a desirable form of government? I think not. It is an 
attractive prospect in some ways, to be sure, and I shall note some of 
*An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the American Political Science 
Association Ethical Issues Seminar on "The Status of Citizenship," Washington, 
D.C., August 1980. I am indebted to James Dick and Daniel Sabia for their comments 
on that paper, and I am especially grateful to Nannerl 0. Keohane, the seminar 
leader, for her criticism and encouragement. 
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these in this paper. But it also has its drawbacks, notably its 
tendency to render political action less meaningful, rather than 
more, than it is at present. To put the point in terms I shall define 
later, instant direct democracy threatens to discourage people from 
acting as ethical citizens. I must emphasize at the outset, though, 
that my criticism is aimed only at this particular form of direct 
democracy. For that reason, it seems best to begin with a sketch of 
instant direct democracy. 
As a preface to this sketch, I should like to enter the following 
qualifications. First, in order to avoid the charge that I have merely 
set up a straw man, I try to portray instant direct democracy in the 
most favorable light. Some readers may suspect that I overstate the 
case in its behalf. Second, some of the features of this sketch, such as 
the terms of office for president and judges, are somewhat arbitrary. 
Those who do not think that the president in such a system should 
serve a term of one year may trim or extend the term as they see fit, 
making similar adjustments to similar features of the scheme. 
Third, because I try to outline an instant direct democracy which is 
as direct and as democratic as possible, I do not consider the 
possibility of using computers and cables to create a mixture of 
representative and direct government. Some of the arguments 
against the pure case of instant direct democracy may tell against 
these mixed forms, others may not. Finally, I simply suppose in the 
following sketch that instant direct democracy is in operation. This 
may seem unfair, for I neglect the possibility that a gradual 
transformation might be necessary to prepare citizens to meet the 
demands of the new institutions and procedures. 3 But my purpose is 
to consider the claim, advanced by at least one proponent, that 
instant direct democracy will itself lead to a change in the habits 
and attitudes of the citizenry.4 Given this concern, it seems fair to 
proceed in an admittedly ahistorical manner. 
I 
Let us suppose that the government of the United States has 
somehow been converted into an instant direct democracy. As with 
all forms of direct democracy, the basic premise of this regime is that 
the people, not their intermediaries, should themselves determine 
the policies which govern their lives. To make this possible, a 
computer console has been installed in the home of every member of 
the electorate. These consoles, connected by two-way cable 
television to a computer in the capital, allow the citizen to cast a vote 
on an issue by touching one or more buttons.5 For some issues the 
voters may be asked to rank their preferences among a number of 
alternatives; for others they may be able to select from Approve 
134 Dissent and Affirmation 
Strongly, Approve, Don't Care, Disapprove, and Disapprove 
Strongly. This allows voters to register intensity as well as support 
for or opposition to a proposal, although the range of intensity is 
quite limited. The voter may cast no more than two votes for or 
against a proposal, that is, so that someone who votes Disapprove 
Strongly (or Approve Strongly) will have cast the maximum number 
of votes on an issue. In every case, a proposal is adopted if it receives 
more positive than negative votes. 
In this instant direct democracy the citizens themselves are the 
legislators, and each week they vote on one or more issues. This 
referendum is conducted via cable television, where the proposals of 
the week are announced, then debated by their proponents and 
opponents. These debates are rebroadcast at various times 
throughout the week so that everyone may see them, and at the end 
of the week the referendum is held. The polls are open, so to speak, at 
three different times during the day to give everyone a chance to 
participate. Those who cannot be home at any of these times can 
arrange to vote at a post office, library, city hall, or public office of 
some sort. 
The executive and judicial branches of government play 
important, but diminished, roles in this scheme. The executive 
branch is responsible not only for carrying out policies approved by 
the electorate, but also for providing regular televised briefings on 
matters of public concern. The president is elected by direct popular 
vote to serve a term of one year in office. A president may be re-
elected, but not to consecutive terms, and the man or woman who 
holds this office may be removed at any time by the vote of the 
majority of the electorate. Although the president exercises certain 
emergency powers, they do not include the authority to introduce or 
veto legislation. 
The president appoints the members of the national judiciary, 
but nominees must be approved by a majority of those voting in 
special referenda, with the pool of eligible voters comprising the 
citizens who live in the jurisdiction in question. Every citizen may 
vote for or against a nominee to the Supreme Court, that is, but only 
those who reside in the relevant jurisdiction may vote for or against 
a nominee to a Court of Appeals or a District Court. Once admitted to 
the bench, judges remain subject to recall throughout their tenure. 
They apply and interpret the law, but they are not allowed to declare 
a policy approved by the citizens to be ultra vires. 
These are the basic features of an instant direct democracy. I 
shall now add a bit more detail to the sketch by anticipating some 
practical objections which may be brought against a scheme of this 
sort. 
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The first objection is that it will prove too expensive. This claim 
cannot be refuted, strictly speaking, because no one (to my 
knowledge) has calculated the costs involved. We do have some idea, 
though, of how much it costs to maintain Congress-about 
$519,000,000 in personnel costs alone in 1974, for instance6-and in 
light of this one may wonder whether instant direct democracy 
might not prove less expensive than our current form of 
government. One may also ask, what makes something too 
expensive? According to one advocate, the argument that instant 
direct democracy is "prohibitively expensive" is a "highly 
disreputable argument. If we have any serious regard for the value 
of democracy, then we ought to be prepared to expend resources on 
it. A society which prefers to allocate resources to the pomp of 
Government, and to royalty, presidency or members of the inner 
caucus of the Party, has failed to take democracy seriously 
enough."7 
Another objection is that instant direct democracy invites 
fraud. A number of safeguards can be employed, however, including 
steps to insure that only the person to whom it is assigned can 
operate a console. This could be accomplished by using cards and 
codes, as automatic cash machines at banks do; or the consoles 
could be designed to require the thumbprint of the assigned person 
before registering a vote.8 The same measures could prevent voters 
from voting more than one time on any issue. Other precautions, 
such as security screening and "failsafe" procedures, could protect 
against the possibility of tampering with the computer. 
This leaves the most serious of the practical objections: the 
charge that the electorate will be at the mercy of those who set the 
agenda. How issues are formulated, what proposals are put before 
the public, even the order in which alternatives are submitted to the 
vote-all these are important problems which cannot be settled by 
the people's vote, for they must be settled before the people vote. This 
is to say that at least one set of intermediaries is necessary even in 
an instant direct democracy. The problem is to see to it that the 
intermediaries are under the control of the people, not the other way 
around. 
To meet this problem we may suppose that once a year the 
citizens elect an Agenda Committee. This committee formulates 
proposals which its members present on television at the end of each 
week's referendum, and any proposal which draws at least a third of 
the votes cast is selected. When this is done, the Agenda Committee 
chooses speakers from its ranks to take part in the televised debate 
on the merits of the proposal(s) in question, then sets to work to 
formulate the proposals for the following week. Like the president 
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and judges, members of this committee are subject to recall at any 
time. In this way the Agenda Committee, the sole indirect element in 
this instant democracy, remains subject to the control of the 
citizenry. 
This is only a sketch of instant direct democracy, of course, not a 
full portrait. Nevertheless, it should serve to indicate that a direct 
democracy of this sort is neither hopelessly far-fetched nor 
absolutely inconceivable. With this in mind, let us now consider its 
attractions. 
II 
Instant direct democracy promises to be an attractive way to 
conduct a nation's affairs in several respects. There is no legislature, 
to begin with, so the problems associated with representative 
government are problems no longer. There is no need to worry about 
whether representatives should act as delegates or trustees, for 
instance, or in what proportion they should mix these roles. 
Moreover, direct democracy guarantees that no one will be either 
under-or over-represented. As matters now stand in the United 
States, the Senate in one way and the House in another give more 
weight to some person's preferences than to others'. In the Senate, 
the citizens of the less populous states enjoy an advantage because 
every state elects two Senators. In the House, with its single-member 
districts, those who do not vote for the successful candidate-and 
this may be a majority of voters when there are more than two 
candidates-can be said, in a sense, to have no representative at all. 
Problems such as these vanish in a direct democracy, where 
everyone has an equal part in setting policy. 
Equality figures also in the second attractive feature of instant 
direct democracy: the reduction of the influence of interest groups. 
In a representative government, the representatives of interest 
groups typically gather in the capital to try to influence the 
representatives of the people. In many cases interest groups even do 
what they can to determine who is elected to the legislature. The 
abolition of the legislature might not bring a halt to the lobbying 
efforts of these groups, but it would certainly hinder them. Insofar 
as the Agenda Committee in the preceding sketch assumes some of 
the functions of a legislative body, it will also afford some 
opportunities for lobbying. But insofar as these functions will be 
limited, we may expect that the opportunities for lobbying will be 
limited as well. 
Direct democracy also promises to end or minimize some of the 
legislative maneuvers which characterize representative 
government. There would be no filibuster in an instant direct 
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democracy, for example, nor would there be committee chairmen 
from "safe" districts to delay the passage oflaws favored by a clear 
majority of the people. For better or worse, log-rolling and pork-
barrel politics in general will be nearly impossible in such a system. 
This is not a necessary consequence of direct democracy, to be sure, 
for direct democracy does not itself eliminate strategic voting. It is a 
consequence of instant direct democracy, however, because the 
large number of voters and their isolation from one another will 
prevent them from sending signals, "thus reducing the scope for 
strategic behavior to its bare minimum .... "9 
We may note, too, that instant direct democracy will probably 
not suffer from what many consider to be a major defect of 
contemporary American government-its. emphasis on 
personalities rather than issues. This tendency may be more 
pronounced in the United States than elsewhere, but it is likely to 
appear in all representative governments. When we have to choose a 
representative, after all, we usually want to know something about 
his or her character. In a large polity where access to the mass 
communications media is widespread, this concern for character 
seems to degenerate into a concern for personality, image, or 
"charisma." This is in marked contrast to instant direct democracy, 
where the issues themselves are likely to be at the center of 
attention. 
Some may also find instant direct democracy attractive, finally, 
because it is free from the intolerance and pressure to conform 
which, in the eyes of critics, characterize other forms of direct 
democracy. On this view, direct democracy of the sort found in face-
to-face societies purchases community and equality at the expense 
of more precious values, liberty and privacy. As one critic puts it, 
"direct democracy effaces boundaries and separations, while 
subjecting everything to the publicly political imperative. This 
imperative repels the exploration of possibilities in nonpublic life 
that the spirit ofrepresentative democracy fosters." 10 Not everyone 
accepts this criticism of the traditional forms of direct democracy; 
yet those who do should recognize that an instant direct democracy 
will differ from the traditional forms, largely because it is not 
confined to face-to-face societies. Given the size of the body politic 
and the isolation of citizens voting in the privacy of their homes, 
instant direct democracy seems to preserve the desirable features of 
other forms of direct democracy while minimizing the prospect of 
smug or brutish intolerance.11 
In all these respects instant direct democracy appears to be an 
appealing system of government. These are not the only respects 
which matter, though, and in the remainder of this paper I shall 
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argue that more important considerations count against 
government by electronic referenda. We may also expect that some 
people will not agree that all the features mentioned above are to be 
counted in favor of instant direct democracy; indeed, I turn the last 
feature against it later in this essay. The purpose of this section, 
however, is not to provide a conclusive argument, but to suggest that 
this novel form of direct democracy should not be rejected without 
consideration-for there is something to be said in its behalf. 
III 
Any advocate of instant direct democracy must expect that he 
or she will soon face the challenge, "Are the people of this (or any) 
country willing and able to govern themselves in this way?" There is 
abundant evidence to suggest that they are not. Sidney Verba and 
Norman Nie report, for example, that 22% of the electorate of the 
United States take no part in politics; another 67% participate only 
occasionally .12 When researchers study levels of political awareness 
and information, furthermore, the surveys almost always reveal 
that most people are ill-informed, misinformed, or uninformed. In 
these circumstances it is easy to understand how some might fear 
that the policies adopted by an instant direct democracy will prove 
to be short-sighted, ill-conceived, and ultimately disastrous. 
This is the kind of argument we associate with elitists, 
democratic and otherwise. Because the people lack the capacity to 
deal with the difficult issues in politics, the argument holds, they 
ought to entrust their governance to those who are wiser, more 
prudent, and more public-spirited. Yet even an advocate of 
participatory democracy may conclude that instant direct 
democracy goes too far. Thus C.B. Macpherson says that the most 
democratic government we can hope for at the level of the nation-
state, even with the aid of computers and cables, must still be a 
mixture of direct and indirect government. Some form of 
representation is necessary, as he sees it, if questions are to be 
formulated properly and if inconsistent demands are to be 
reconciled. Otherwise, voters would 
very likely demand a reduction of unemployment at the same time as they are 
demanding a reduction of inflation, or an increase in government expenditures along 
with the decrease in taxes.. . . To avoid the need for a body to adjust such 
incompatible demands ... the questions would have to be framed in a way that would 
require of each voter a degree of sophistication impossible to expect.1'' 
Participatory democrats and elitists may agree, then, that 
instant direct democracy requires too much of the average person. 
But there is at least one political philosopher who is not persuaded 
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by this argument. Robert Paul Wolff is, he says, "a good deal more 
than half in earnest" about the proposal for instant direct 
democracy he advances in his In Defense of Anarchism. There Wolff 
anticipates the criticism just set out and offers the following 
rebuttal: 
The initial reponse to .. .instant direct democracy would be chaotic, to be sure. But 
very quickly, men would learn-what is now manifestly not true-that their votes 
made a difference in the world, an immediate, visible difference. There is nothing 
which brings on a sense of responsibility so fast as that awareness. America would 
see an immediate and invigorating rise in interest in politics. It would hardly be 
necessary to launch expensive and frustrating campaigns to get out the vote. Politics 
would be on the lips of every man, woman, and child, day after day. 14 
Whose position is more plausible, Wolffs or the critics'? I must 
side with the critics. For we need not believe that the average man or 
woman is stupid, selfish, or irrational to believe that instant direct 
democracy is too taxing a method of government. What disqualifies 
most of us as policy makers may simply be the lack of time to become 
suitably informed about the complex problems we face as a nation. 
Because these issues are so complex and so entangled, one may have 
to be a full-time student of politics to acquire the necessary grasp of 
these matters. There may be much that instant direct democracy 
can do to increase our political sophistication, but it cannot itself 
give us the time to learn all we would need to know. 
Time is not the only consideration here, of course. People seem 
to "find time" for matters which are important to them, and it is 
possible that the number of those who take an interest in political 
questions may increase dramatically with a shift to instant direct 
democracy. This is Wolffs position. In his view, the real source of 
the average person's apathy is the realization that his or her voice is 
too faint to be heard in our elite-dominated political system. If he 
sees that his vote actually makes a difference, then the average 
person may attach more significance to public matters and find the 
time to inform himself about them. 
Wolffs account of the cause of political apathy may be true, if 
not the whole truth of the matter. If we grant this, however, it still 
does not follow that the creation of an instant direct democracy is 
the cure for this malady. For it is far from apparent that the citizens 
of an instant direct democracy will see that their votes make "an 
immediate, visible difference" in the world. Their votes will 
certainly make a difference in this system, for their votes determine 
the outcome. But the individual voter is not likely to find that his 
vote makes a difference. As one voter among millions, he may 
conclude that his vote is utterly insignificant; and this may lead to 
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the further conclusion that time spent gathering political 
information is time wasted. 
This conclusion is at least as likely as that which Wolff foresees. 
If the voters perceive that their individual votes are insignificant, 
we cannot expect them to develop the sense of responsibility that 
follows, according to Wolff, from the awareness that their votes 
matter. It seems, instead, that the sense ofreponsibility is what now 
brings many people to the polls in a national election, for it is nearly 
certain that any individual's vote will have no affect on the 
outcome.15 What an advocate of instant direct democracy must 
show is that some feature(s) of this system would instill a 
heightened sense of responsibility in the citizens, thus encouraging 
them to take an active part in public affairs. Wolff fails to do this. 
So Wolffs claim is implausible. Yet we must be careful to note 
what this implies. Even if Wolff is wrong, it does not follow that the 
critics of instant direct democracy are right when they contend that 
the result of this system will be contradictory, imprudent, and 
disastrous policies. This may happen, just as it may happen that 
people will meet their responsibilities. But there is a third 
possibility-that most people, aware of the insignificance of their 
individual votes, will simply ignore the referenda and leave the 
resolution of policy to that small group who find politics enjoyable 
or compelling. If this should happen, we would have no cause to 
worry-no more than we already have, anyhow-about the 
soundness of policy in an instant direct democracy. But is the risk 
worth taking? It may be if govenment by electronic referenda has 
something else to offer us. For sound policy is not the only thing to be 
desired from political institutions and processes; we may also want 
institutions and procedures which enrich human life. This goal 
cannot be reached unless people are encouraged to act as citizens, 
however, and this instant direct democracy is unlikely to do. 
IV 
In this section I shall argue that instant direct democracy is 
undesirable as a form of national government because it threatens 
to discourage citizenship. If this claim seems odd, it is probably 
because we now use "citizen" in an attenuated sense of the word. All 
the more reason to begin this argument by distinguishing between 
two conceptions of citizenship.16 
When we call someone a citizen nowadays, we ordinarily mean 
only that he or she is legally entitled to participate in public affairs. 
Whether one does what he is entitled to do-whether one actually 
participates-is seldom regarded as a test of one's citizenship. Our 
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modern view of citizenship tends to be passive and legalistic, in 
other words, a matter of privileges and immunities rather than 
duties and responsibilities. 
In contrast to this is the conception of citizenship bequeathed to 
us by the ancient polis and ciuitas. On this view citizenship is, or 
ought to be, a public vocation which requires us to take an active 
part in matters of public concern and to act with the interests of the 
community in mind. This conception, with its emphasis on the 
responsibilities of the citizen, no longer prevails, but neither has it 
vanished. We still attach "good," "ethical," or "responsible" to 
"citizen" when we want to distinguish a "true" citizen from those 
who are citizens merels in the legal sense of the word, for instance. 
When we do this, we invoke the ethical conception of citizenship. 
We have, then, two different, if not entirely distinct, conceptions 
of citizenship. According to the first, citizenship is essentially a 
matter of legal status; according to the second, it is essentially 
ethical. The ethical conception presupposes the legal because it 
takes the right to participate in public affairs as a necessary 
condition of citizenship; but it also considers this right to be far from 
sufficient in itself. In this sense we still share the ancients' 
conviction that those who consistently fail to exercise their rights 
and meet their responsibilities as citizens are not really citizens at 
all. This is the sense I draw upon when I say that instant direct 
democracy is likely to discourage (ethical) citizenship. 
Assuming for the moment that instant direct democracy will 
have this effect, why should we care? What is the value of (ethical) 
citizenship? Perhaps the best· answer begins with Aristotle's 
definition: "as soon as .a man becomes entitled to participate in 
authority, deliberative or judicial, we deem him to be a citizen .... " 17 
This suggests that citizenship both recognizes and cultivates the 
faculties of judgment and deliberation. To be accorded the status of 
citizen is to be recognized as one capable ofleading a rational, self-
governed life-and as one who has a right, following from this 
ability, to participate in the government of the community. Those 
who are denied this recognition, even if they are ranked as "second-
class citizens," are demeaned as less than fully rational and as 
unworthy of equal respect and concern. 
As the status of citizenship recognizes one's human faculties, so 
the life of the citizen cultivates them. A person becomes a citizen in 
the legal sense of the word when he or she (pace Aristotle) appears to 
be ready to participate in ,authority. Yet it is through this 
participation-through judging and deliberating-that one 
develops these capacities. This is to say that citizenship enriches 
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lives by promoting both mental and moral growth. Certainly the 
problems the citizen faces qua cit~en are often complex, whether 
they are primarily technical questions-what will the effects of a tax 
cut be?-or questions of strategy-how can we persuade others to 
vote with us on this issue? We need not fear, then, that anyone who 
takes the vocation of citizenship seriously will lack for mental 
exercise. 
Nor need we fear that the moral muscles of the citizen will grow 
flabby from lack of use, for (ethical) citizenship calls these into play 
as well. It does this in at least two ways. First, (ethical) citizenship 
requires the individual to look beyond private interests to the 
interests of the community. In this fashion the public vocation of 
citizenship demands that thecitizen'sjudgmentanddeliberation be 
employed in the service of the community. Second, citizenship 
promotes moral growth by leading the citizen to confront the 
fundamental question, how should we order our life as a 
community? For however technical, trivial, or prosaic political 
questions may seem to be, they refer ultimately to a way oflife-an 
ethos-and are therefore ethical questions. 
There is ample reason to believe, then, that the civic ·vocation 
promotes both moral and mental growth, thereby enriching not only 
the life of the individual, but the life of the community as well. This 
seems to warrant the conclusion that (ethical) citizenship is 
valuable indeed. Any method of government which encourages it is 
desirable, ceteris paribus, and any which discourages it is not. What 
remains is to show that instant direct democracy falls into the latter 
category. 
When I say that instant direct democracy is likely to discourage 
(ethical) citizenship, I do not mean that it is unique in this respect. In 
many ways it will only extend certain conditions which already 
prevail in modem nation-states. One of these is the overwhelming 
size of the nation-state.18 As I noted in the discussion of Wolffs 
argument, the knowledge that one's participation is· virtually 
insignificant may well lead the individual to withdraw or abstain 
from political activity. There is also reason to believe that the 
individual's willingness to cooperate in public projects decreases as 
the size of the public increases. More than 200 years ago 
Montesquieu observed, "In a la:nge republic, the commob good is 
sacrificed to any number of other considerations; it is subject to 
exceptions; it comes to depend upon accidents. In a small republic, 
the public good is more keenly felt, better known, closer to every 
citizen; abuses are spread less widely, and consequently, are less 
tolerated."19 More recently and more formally, others have 
demonstrated that members of large groups have little incentive to 
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cooperate in a group venture when they can be free riders.20 This 
implies, other things being equal, that the larger the body politic, the 
less the likelihood that people will cooperate freely to achieve public 
goods and the greater the likelihood that coercion will be required. 
We cannot blame the size of the nation-state on direct 
democracy, instant or otherwise, of course. But unlike some forms of 
direct democracy, such as those that call for the decentralization of 
political authority, instant direct democracy offers nothing to 
reduce or counteract the effects of size. The ability to vote at home 
may make voting easier and thus more attractive for some. But 
when the individual casts a vote in a national referendum, he should 
soon become aware of the futility of this action. The immensity of 
the polity and the insignificance of the individual's vote will be 
brought home on cable television. 
The size of the nation-state contributes also to another 
condition hostile to (ethical) citizenship-the lack of community. If 
an individual is to take the part of the citizen, he usually needs to feel 
a part of a community whose concerns are his concerns. We cannot 
expect many people to act with the public good in mind if that public 
holds no meaning for them. What we should expect in these 
circumstances is that many will fail to participate in politics, while 
many of those who do take part will simply regard their 
participation as the public pursuit of private ends. 
This, again, is not the fault of instant direct democracy. It is, 
however, a problem which the electronic referendum is likely to 
aggravate. By enabling us to vote in the privacy of our homes, 
instant direct democracy may isolate us still further from public 
contact. In such a system we may los~ even the slight contact now 
involved in going to the polls, standing in line, and casting one's 
ballot. Little as it is, this public effort should remind us that voting is 
a public act which carries with it public responsibility.21 In an 
instant direct democracy this' reminder may well disappear. 
Certainly it will be difficult to stir people to act on behalf of the 
public when the public is only a vague notion referring to something 
beyond one's walls. 
Finally, we should note that instant direct democracy will 
probably accelerate the tendency for politics to become a spect~tor 
sport, or perhaps a television game show. This may occur as politics 
is reduced to little but voting. The elements of politics which 
contribute to the enrichment of life-debate, compromise, 
deliberation, for instance-are likely to vanish as the mechanical 
act of voting in the priva~y of one's home, free from the frustration of 
confronting others with different views, becomes almost the only 
connection between most citizens (in the legal sense) and public life. 
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Judgment will not be sharpened by this process; deliberation will 
not be fostered; and the capacity of citizenship to enrich the life of 
the individual and the community will go unrealized. 
Whether one takes these to be telling criticisms of instant direct 
democracy will depend, in the end, on the value one attaches to 
(ethical) citizenship and participatory democracy. If one believes 
that citizenship is merely a matter of legal status and that political 
participation is primarily a means of expressing personal 
preferences, then the prospect of wedding computers and cables to 
democratic government may prove quite attractive, for it promises 
an efficient and accurate way of registering the preferences of the 
populace. Democracy, on this vrew, is desirable because it affords 
everyone an equal opportunity to protect or promote his or her 
interests. This is the vision which seems to inspire many writers in 
the traditions of utilitarianism and welfare economics. Others, 
Mulford Sibley among them, find this vision narrow and cramped. 
And if one believes that political participation can and should be 
something more than a way of registering preferences-that it is 
valuable as a way of cultivating abilities and strengthening social 
bonds-then the prospect of instant direct democracy is disquieting 
indeed. 
v 
All this is to say that instant direct democracy threatens to 
devalue politics by converting an activity into a process, thereby 
discouraging (ethical) citizenship. Since the quality of the policy it 
will produce is also suspect, we have reason to conclude that we 
should not be striving to establish a government by electronic 
referenda. These criticisms apply only 'to instant direct democracy, 
however, not to other forms. There may be more to be said for more 
decentralized versions of direct democracy or even for more 
localized forms of instant direct democracy. 22 Attempts to combine 
elements of the instant referendum with representative government 
may also prove quite a ttrtacti ve. 23 The opportunities exist; it remains 
for political theorists to explore them. 
What I wish to suggest is that we attend to two themes in 
Mulford Sibley's work as we explore these opportunities to remodel 
our political system. We should remember that political 
participation is a means of enriching life and that technological 
advances do not always bring corresponding advances in the 
political realm. When we.examine the ways in which computers and 
cables may be used to reform our political arrangements, then, we 
should keep one question in mind: How will these changes affect the 
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vocation of citizenship? There is little incentive to follow this 
vocation now; to discourage it further is to risk its complete loss. 
